Will he or
won’t he? This time last year, that was the question. Russian President
Vladimir Putin had massed almost 200,000 troops on Ukraine’s borders. U.S. intelligence warned that Russia
was preparing for an all-out war. All the signs pointed to an assault, bar one: it
seemed unthinkable.
True,
Russia had attacked Ukraine in 2014, and in the spring of 2021 had staged a
dress rehearsal for an invasion, building up forces on the frontier before
sending them home. Putin seemed ever angrier at Kyiv’s refusal to bow to his
will. He openly derided Ukrainian national identity and sovereignty. Still, it
was shocking, when Russian forces did roll in, that a nuclear-armed power in
2022 would seek to conquer a neighbour in an act of unprovoked aggression.
Beyond the
devastation in Ukraine, the war has cast a long shadow over global affairs.
For
Russia, so far it has been disastrous. An offensive that was supposed to
subjugate Ukraine, weaken the West, and strengthen the Kremlin has, up to now,
done the opposite. It has turbo-charged Ukrainian nationalism and pushed Kyiv
closer to Europe. It has breathed new purpose into a previously adrift NATO.
Finland and Sweden joining the alliance, which seems on track, will
dramatically shift the balance of force in Northern Europe, more than doubling
the length of Russia’s borders with NATO states. The war has laid bare
weaknesses in Russia’s military that operations in Syria (2015) and Ukraine
(2014 and 2015) had disguised. It has revealed resolve and competence in the
West that fiascoes in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya had obscured (though
admittedly things might have been different had the U.S. been under other
leadership).
Still, the
war is far from over. Russia’s economy has adapted to massive Western
sanctions. The Kremlin appears convinced that Russia has staying power. Moscow
might yet force an ugly settlement and set a troubling precedent for aggression
elsewhere. If, on the other hand, Putin feels truly in peril, due to Ukrainian
advances or other reasons, it is not impossible – unlikely, but hard to completely rule out – that he
will use a nuclear weapon as a last roll of the dice. Whatever happens in
Ukraine, the West and Russia will likely remain a miscalculation away from
confrontation.
For China,
the war has been mostly a headache. Despite Chinese President Xi Jinping’s
public embrace of Putin and continued trade between the two countries that has
helped Russia weather sanctions, Beijing’s material support has been
lacklustre. Xi has not sent weapons. He appears disturbed by Putin’s travails
and nuclear bluster. Beijing does not want to undercut Moscow and is
unlikely to compel Putin to reach a settlement. But neither does it wish to
provoke Western capitals by abetting the invasion. It watches warily as U.S.
allies in Asia bolster defences and seem even keener to keep Washington around,
even as they still want access to Chinese markets. The war has heightened fears
of a Chinese assault on Taiwan. But an invasion that seemed too risky for
Beijing in the near term even before the war seems – at least for now – even less likely. The massive sanctions imposed on
Russia are not lost on China. Nor are Moscow’s battlefield failures.
As for the
relationship – between
the U.S. and China – that will
dominate the coming decades, the Russia-Ukraine war has not changed the
fundamentals. U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s August visit to Taiwan riled Beijing, but the meeting three months
later between U.S. President Joe Biden and Xi promised a resumption of
dialogue. Competition is still baked into the two countries’ foreign policies,
however. Chinese designs upon Taiwan are not going anywhere. Though the world’s
two biggest economies remain entwined, technological decoupling is under way
The war has shone light on
non-Western middle powers’ influence and autonomy. Turkey, long walking a
tightrope between NATO membership and ties to Moscow, has brokered, with the
United Nations, a deal to get Ukrainian grain onto global markets via the Black
Sea. The initiative follows years of Turkish assertiveness abroad, including
tipping the battlefield balance in Libya and the South Caucasus and expanding
drone sales. For Saudi Arabia, the abrupt removal of Russian oil from the
market was a boon. It forced a visit from Biden, who had entered office
promising to shun Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. Riyadh decided, with
other oil producers, to keep prices high, much to Washington’s fury. India, at
once a U.S. security partner and major purchaser of Russian arms, has both
bought knock-off Russian oil and chided Putin for his nuclear sabre-rattling.
This is no coordinated non-aligned movement. But activist middle powers feel
space to chart their own course and, while few welcome big-power rivalry, will
seize the opportunities that multipolarity bringsElsewhere in the Global
South, the war exposed raw nerves. Most non-Western capitals joined in UN
General Assembly votes against Russia’s aggression. But few have condemned
Putin publicly or imposed sanctions. Many have reason – trade, mostly,
but also historical ties or reliance on Kremlin-linked Wagner Group mercenaries – not to break with
Moscow. They see picking a side or incurring costs for a war many believe is
Europe’s problem as against their interests. Frustration with the West plays a
role too, whether over COVID-19 vaccine hoarding, migration policy or climate
injustice. Many see a double standard in outrage over Ukraine given the West’s
interventions elsewhere and colonial record. Many Global South leaders also
believe, particularly when it comes to sanctions, that Western governments have
put fighting Russia over the global economy.
Indeed,
outside Europe, the war’s biggest ramifications are economic. Financial jitters
triggered by the invasion and announcement of sanctions roiled markets that
COVID-19 had already shaken. Food and fuel commodity prices shot up, sparking a
cost of living crisis. Though prices have since come down, inflation remains
rampant, magnifying debt problems. The pandemic and economic crisis are two
among several mutually reinforcing threats, notably also including climate
change and food insecurity, that can beset vulnerable countries and fuel unrest.
On this year’s list, Pakistan is a prime example. Many countries are in similar
boats.
Did 2022
give any cause for optimism for the year ahead? Given Ukraine’s anguish,
finding good in the war might seem perverse. But had Kyiv put up less of a
fight, had the West been less united than it was under Biden’s leadership, and
had Russia prevailed, Europe, and arguably the world, would be in a more
dangerous place. Nor was Putin the only strongman who had a bad year. Several
populists, whose politics have recently sown much discord, also lost out. Jair
Bolsonaro was defeated in Brazil. Former U.S. President Donald Trump appears,
for now, a diminished figure. Marine Le Pen failed to win the French
presidency. In Italy, where populists did win power, they mostly tacked centre
once in office. Far-right populism is not a spent force, but some of its
champions suffered setbacks. Plus, multilateral diplomacy largely muddled
through. Notwithstanding their bitter differences, China, Russia and Western
powers still mostly saw the UN Security Council as a venue to manage crises
outside Ukraine. A deal that could end Ethiopia’s horrific war and warmer
Colombia-Venezuela ties show that peacemaking elsewhere can trundle along
despite conflict in Europe.
Overall, though, it was an unsettling year, all the more so given that it’s the latest in a string of them. The pandemic upended much of the globe. An angry mob stormed the U.S. Capitol. Temperatures in parts of the world threaten human survival. Now, a major war rages in Europe, its architect invokes nuclear escalation, and several poor countries face debt crises, hunger and extreme weather. None of these events arrived without warning, and yet a few years ago they would have boggled the mind.
So, will
2023 see major powers go to war or break a nearly 80-year nuclear taboo? Will
political crises, economic hardship and climate breakdown cause social meltdown
in not just individual countries but a swath of the world? Worst-case answers
to this year’s big questions seem far-fetched. But after the past few years, it
would be complacent to dismiss the unthinkable
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